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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
STATE OF IDAHO, ) 
) 
Plaintiff-Respondent, ) 
) 
) 
V. ) 
) 
WILLIAM FRANKLIN WOLFE, ) 
) 
Defendant-Appellant. ) 
___________ ) 
NO. 41750 
IDAHO CO. NO. CR 1982-18290 & CV 2005-
36455 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 
ON REVIEW 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
This Court has granted Mr. Wolfe's petition for review in which he challenges the 
district court's subject matter jurisdiction. 
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ISSUE 
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Wolfe's motion for reconsideration of his 
Rule 35 motion alleging an illegal sentence, and when the district court denied 
Mr. Wolfe's subsequent Rule 35 motion alleging an illegal sentence? 
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ARGUMENT 
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Wolfe's Motion For Reconsideration Of His 
Rule 35 Motion Alleging An Illegal Sentence, And When The District Court Denied 
Mr. Wolfe's Subsequent Rule 35 Motion Alleging An Illegal Sentence 
A. Introduction 
This Court has jurisdiction to consider Mr. Wolfe's appeal, and, because Rule 35 
gave the district court jurisdiction to consider Mr. Wolfe's claims, the district court erred 
by denying Mr. Wolfe's motion for reconsideration of his Rule 35 motion alleging an 
illegal sentence and his subsequent Rule 35 motion alleging an illegal sentence. 
B. The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Wolfe's Motion For Reconsideration 
Of His Rule 35 Motion Alleging An Illegal Sentence, And VVhen The District Court 
Denied Mr. Wolfe's Subsequent Rule 35 Motion Alleging An Illegal Sentence 
The State presents two arguments on review. First, the State asserts that this 
Court lacks jurisdiction to review the 2006 district court order which held that Mr. Wolfe's 
jurisdictional claims were procedurally barred. (Respondent's Brief on Review, pp.4-6.) 
Second, the State asserts that the district court lacked jurisdiction to consider 
Mr. Wolfe's claims. (Respondent's Brief on Review, pp.7-10) 
1. This Court has Jurisdiction to Consider Mr. Wolfe's Claim 
With regard to the claim that this Court lacks jurisdiction, the State asserts that 
"the only order before this Court on appeal, and therefore the only order over which this 
Court has appellate jurisdiction, is the district court order of April 29, 2011, denying 
Wolfe a hearing on his Rule 35 motion on the basis that the motion had been denied in 
2006." (Respondent's Brief on Review, p.4.) It appears that the State's assertion is that 
the district court's order denying Mr. Wolfe's motion for reconsideration of the denial of 
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his initial Rule 35 motion alleging an illegal sentence was limited to a ruling regarding 
his request for a hearing on this motion. 
The State's argument is belied by the record in this case and it exalts substance 
over form. Following the denial of his initial Rule 35 motion alleging an illegal sentence, 
Mr. Wolfe filed a motion for reconsideration with the trial court because the district court 
initially and erroneously dismissed his Rule 35 motion as untimely. (R., pp.49-55.) In 
order to precipitate action on his motion for reconsideration, Mr. Wolfe subsequently 
filed a motion seeking a hearing on his motion that had been left unaddressed for years. 
(R., pp.289-291.) Within the motion requesting a hearing itself, Mr. Wolfe reiterated his 
claim that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction and further supplemented 
for the court a recent Idaho Supreme Court case that addressed a similar issue. 
(R., pp.290-291.) 
The district court's order reflects that the court was ruling on the merits of 
Mr. Wolfe's request for reconsideration. In setting forth Mr. Wolfe's request for 
reconsideration, the court stated, "Mr. Wolfe argues that the State of Idaho lacked 
subject matter jurisdiction to try him for this crime and his conviction and sentence are 
therefore illegal." (R., p.299.) After setting out Mr. Wolfe's claims for reconsideration, 
the court thereafter found that Mr. Wolfe's present claims were fully addressed in the 
prior Rule 35 motion and the post-conviction petition. (R., p.299.) The court then 
denied relief on res judicata grounds. (R., p.299.) The substance of the district court's 
order reflects that it was addressing the actual merits of Mr. Wolfe's request for 
reconsideration of the prior denial of his Rule 35 motion, not merely finding that he was 
not entitled to a hearing. If the court's ruling were limited to whether a hearing should 
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be held, and not the merits of the request for reconsideration as well, the res judicata 
analysis would be superfluous. 
Additionally, because Mr. Wolfe reiterated his argument that the district court 
lacked subject matter jurisdiction within his request for a hearing on his motion for 
reconsideration, the substance of this filing should likewise be deemed to be a motion 
alleging an illegal sentence. (R., pp.289-297.) "Idaho appellate courts have long held 
that, with respect to post-judgment pleadings filed by convicted defendants, substance 
governs over form, and a mislabeled pleading will be treated according to its 
substance." Schwartz v. State, 145 Idaho 186, 190 (Ct. App. 2008); see also 
McDowell v. Geokan, 73 Idaho 430, 439 (1953); State v. Blume, 113 Idaho 224, 226 
(Ct. App. 1987). Within his request for a hearing, Mr. Wolfe reiterated his prior assertion 
in his motion for reconsideration both that the district court erroneously denied his prior 
Rule 35 motion as untimely, and that the State of Idaho lacked subject matter 
jurisdiction over his underlying criminal case. (R., pp.289-297.) Accordingly, the motion 
seeking a hearing on the motion for reconsideration, on its own, is a Rule 35 motion 
seeking to challenge an illegal sentence. As the current appeal is timely from this order, 
this Court has jurisdiction. 
Finally, the April 29, 2011 order is not the only order over which this Court has 
jurisdiction. Following the denial of Mr. Wolfe's motion for reconsideration, Mr. Wolfe 
filed a second motion alleging an illegal sentence that incorporated additional facts and 
evidence demonstrating the absence of subject matter jurisdiction in this case. 
(R., pp.328-364.) Even successive motions brought under Rule 35 that are expressly 
captioned and styled as motions for reconsideration are considered to be separate, 
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independent motions for relief. See State v. Battens, 137 Idaho 730, 732-733 (Ct. App. 
2002). While such successive motions are prohibited where both motions involve a 
request for leniency at sentencing, this is due to the fact that Idaho Criminal Rule 35 
provides that, "no defendant may file more than one motion seeking a reduction of 
sentence under this Rule." I.C.R. 35(b). No such limitation is placed on the filing of 
multiple motions alleging an illegal sentence. I.C.R. 35(a). 
Moreover, Mr. Wolfe's second motion alleging an illegal sentence was subsumed 
within the issues at stake in this appeal by the operation of I.A.R. 17(e)(1 )(C). Under 
this rule, all interlocutory or final orders entered after the judgment or order appealed 
from are deemed to be included within the appeal. I.A.R. 17(e)(1)(C). Where, as here, 
the notice of appeal is filed prior to the district court ruling on a Rule 35 motion in a 
criminal case, the appeal is deemed to subsume the court's ruling on the Rule 35 
motion under the operation of this rule. State v. Fortin, 124 Idaho 323, 326 (Ct. App. 
1993). Accordingly, Mr. Wolfe's second Rule 35 motion alleging an illegal sentence due 
to a lack of subject matter jurisdiction is properly before this Court. 
In sum, this appeal is timely from two orders, both of which address subject 
matter jurisdiction, which are the orders Mr. Wolfe has specifically attacked. Moreover, 
as the State acknowledges, "[a] question of jurisdiction is fundamental; it cannot be 
ignored when brought to [the appellate court's] attention." (See Respondent's Brief on 
Review, p.4 (quoting State v. Kavajecz, 139 Idaho 482 (2003).) Ignoring the claim is 
exactly what the State is asking this Court to do, which is contrary to well-established 
precedent from this Court. 
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2. The District Court Possessed Jurisdiction And Erred By Denying 
Mr. Wolfe's Rule 35 Motions 
The State next asserts that jurisdiction must be proved at trial, and, therefore, the 
jury found jurisdiction in 1982. (Respondent's Brief on Review, p.7.) The State then 
asserts that there is no rule or statute that extended the court's jurisdiction to litigate his 
claims. (Respondent's Brief on Review, p.7.) Next, while acknowledging that when 
Indian jurisdiction is raised, the State bears the burden of proving jurisdiction, 
"applicable law" from other jurisdictions "supports placing on the defendant the burden 
of raising the jurisdictional exception." (Respondent's Brief on Review, p.8.) Therefore, 
the State concludes, "a question of superseding federal Indian jurisdiction 1 should be 
raised by the defendant and litigated at trial." (Respondent's Brief on Review, p.9.) The 
State is incorrect. 
First, as the State acknowledges, subject matter jurisdiction was apparently not 
raised in Mr. Wolfe's trial. (Respondent's Brief on Review, p.9.) To the extent that the 
jury "found jurisdiction" in 1982, it is likely that the jury found only physical jurisdiction. 
The pattern jury instruction for first degree murder requires the State to prove, in 
addition to the circumstances that make the murder one of first degree, 
1. On or about [date] 
2. in the state of Idaho 
1 The State characterizes Mr. Wolfe's claim as involving "superseding federal Indian 
jurisdiction" several times, avoiding the term, "subject matter jurisdiction." This Court 
has held that claims of "superseding federal Indian jurisdiction" are indeed subject 
matter jurisdiction claims. State v. Allen, 100 Idaho 918, 921 (1980)(holding, in a case 
involving a non-emancipated Indian defendant, that the defendant was not subject to 
state prosecution: "[w]e thus reverse the decision of the district court and remand with 
instructions to set aside the conviction and dismiss the information for lack of subject 
matter jurisdiction.") 
7 
3. the defendant [name] engaged in conduct which caused the death of [name 
of decedent], 
4. the defendant acted without justification or excuse, 
5. [and] with malice aforethought, 
Idaho Criminal Jury Instruction 704A. Thus, the jury likely was only asked to determine 
whether the crime occurred "in the state of Idaho." The Nez Perce Indian Reservation is 
physically "in the state of Idaho," but physical jurisdiction is not the question in this case. 
The question is which sovereign possesses the power to prosecute: 
Criminal jurisdiction over Indians is divided among federal, state, and tribal 
governments. A determination of whether one or more of these 
sovereigns possesses criminal jurisdiction in a particular instance depends 
upon the type of offense committed, where the offense was committed, 
and whether either the perpetrator or the victim is an Indian. 
State v. Mathews, 133 Idaho 300, 310 (1999). Thus, to resolve the jurisdictional 
question here, a jury would have to consider the type of offense, the location of the 
offense, and the victim's status. The state has presented no evidence or argument that 
the jury considered subject matter jurisdiction. 
Next, the State's assertion that there was no rule or statute that extended the 
district court's jurisdiction to litigate his claims ignores State v. Lute, 150 Idaho 837 
(2011 ). This Court has held that a Rule 35 motion gives the court jurisdiction to litigate 
subject matter jurisdiction claims: "where a court properly has jurisdiction to consider a 
case - as it does here to consider Lute's I.C.R. 35 motion - and it is apparent that there 
is an issue concerning subject matter jurisdiction or that a defendant was convicted for 
something that is not a crime, this Court must correct that error." Id. at 840. This is 
because, "Idaho Criminal Rule 35 allows a trial court to correct an illegal sentence at 
any time." Id. at 839. 
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Relying on State v. Clements, 148 Idaho 82 (2009), the State asserts that Rule 
35 cannot be used to reexamine the facts of the underlying case. (Respondent's Brief, 
p.10.) In Clements, this Court set forth the general rule that a claim of an illegal 
sentence under Rule 35 is limited to those claims that do "not involve significant 
questions of fact or require an evidentiary hearing." State v. Clements, 148 Idaho 82, 
86 (2009). The Court in Lute was clearly aware of Clements, as the Court cites to 
Clements within the Lute Opinion itself. Lute, 150 Idaho at 839. Despite this, and 
despite the fact that the determination of the subject matter jurisdiction issue in Lute 
depended upon a very significant question of fact - i.e. that the grand jury's term had 
elapsed prior to the issuance of the indictment - the Lute Court carved out an exception 
to the general limitations of Clements where the issue at stake goes to the absence of 
subject matter jurisdiction. And the Court did so expressly on the basis of the 
fundamental importance of subject matter jurisdiction as a potential defect in a criminal 
case. Lute, 150 Idaho at 839-841. 
A Rule 35 motion alleging an illegal sentence is the appropriate vehicle through 
which to raise a claim of the absence of subject matter jurisdiction in a criminal case, 
and such a motion confers jurisdiction on the courts to consider the merits of such a 
claim. The State's argument to the contrary is therefore without merit. 
Finally, the State's assertion that the time to raise or litigate Mr. Wolfe's claims is 
"generally at or before trial," or through a motion for a new trial or petition for post-
conviction relief, ignores this Court's precedent that claims of subject matter jurisdiction 
are never waived and can be raised at any time: 
This issue is so fundamental to the propriety of a court's actions, that 
subject matter jurisdiction can never be waived or consented to, and a 
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court has a sua sponte duty to ensure that it has subject matter jurisdiction 
over a case. See Idaho R. Civ. P. 12(g)(4 ). Furthermore, judgments and 
orders made without subject matter jurisdiction are void and 'are subject to 
collateral attack, and are not entitled to recognition in other states under 
the full faith and credit clause of the United States Constitution." Sierra 
Life Ins. Co. v. Granata, 99 Idaho 624, 626-27, 586 P.2d 1068, 1070-71 
(1978). 
State v. Urrabazo, 150 Idaho 158, 163 (2010) (abrogated on other grounds by Verska v. 
Saint Alphonsus Reg'/ Med. Ctr., 151 Idaho 889 (2011 )). Claims of subject matter 
jurisdiction are not subject to the general rules that accompany other issues. As such, 
Mr. Wolfe's claim is not waived by the fact that it was not raised at trial. And for the 
reasons set forth in Mr. Wolfe's initial brief on review, his claims on appeal now are not 
barred by res judicata. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Wolfe requests that this Court vacate his judgment of conviction and 
sentence for murder because the State of Idaho lacked subject matter jurisdiction over 
the charge. In the alternative, Mr. Wolfe asks that this Court reverse the district court's 
orders denying his motion for reconsideration of the denial of his Rule 35 motion, as 
well as the denial of his subsequent Rule 35 motion, and remand this case for a hearing 
on the merits of these motions. 
DATED this 30 th day of April, 2014. 
JUSTIN . CURTIS 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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